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ABSTRACT 
To what extent has government education spending in Pakistan been effective in reducing 
gender gaps in enrollments? To answer this question, this article reviews the benefit 
incidence of government education spending. It finds that government subsidies directed 
towards primary education are pro poor in all four provinces of Pakistan. Moreover, 
females has disadvantage in access to primary education. However, government subsidies 
directed towards higher education poorly targeted and poorest income group receives less 
than the riches income group and indeed favor those who are better off. Similarly, the 
gender disparity in access to public subsidy is higher at tertiary level and lowest at 
primary level, which also reflects poor targeting. Improving targeting to the poor as well 
as better female participation involves not simply rearranging the public subsidies, but 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
It is generally believed that education is one of the basic rights of every human being, 
irrespective of sex, age, creed, religion, etc. Moreover, the target of universal primary 
education cannot be achieved without female access to educational opportunities, which 
contains several external benefits. In addition, access to educational opportunities 
assumes prime importance for empowerment of women. However, inequalities in access 
to education between males and females can be found in many countries across the world 
including Pakistan. According to conventional wisdom, a combination of cultural, social, 
and economic factors are responsible for placing young girls and women at a serious 
disadvantage vis-a-vis access to school and the prospect of completing their education. 
This disadvantage can be altered through public policies including gender sensitive 
public spending on education.  
 
The above assertion about the role of public policy is based on the theory of public 
finance
2, which demonstrates that public expenditure on education can affect the 
population in a number of ways, which has significant gender dimensions. For example, 
government spending on primary education is likely to generate more income for women 
than spending on universities, for the simple reason that there are relatively more women 
primary school teachers than women university lecturers. Moreover, these expenditures 
provide subsidized educational services, which is a form of “in kind transfers”. These 
“in-kind transfers” improve the current well-being of the recipients, and enhance their 
longer-run income-earning potential. They can be considered as both current and capital 
transfers to the recipients, and therefore can be termed as the “benefit incidence” of 
public spending. 
 
The main concern of this paper is to assess the gender dimension of the “benefit 
incidence”. The study has two basic objectives. First and foremost, it aims to investigate 
which income group actually benefits from the government’s subsidized education 
services? Second, how are these benefits distributed between males and females? In other 
words, this article is an attempt to capture the gender dimension of public spending on 
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education in Pakistan through benefit incidence analysis, which may help to better 
understand the root causes of gender inequality in Pakistan and provide a guideline for 
developing a gender sensitized education policy. 
 
There are three reasons for analyzing gender inequality in public spending on education 
in Pakistan.  First, it is one of the most important services that could empower the 
Pakistani women of today. Second, education spending, especially at the primary level, is 
considered to produce positive external benefits, and therefore, a strong case can be made 
for the continued involvement of the government for gender equitable public spending on 
education. Finally, in 1990s the government of Pakistan initiated a project named 
Pakistan Integrated Household Surveys (PIHS), which consisted of four round running 
through 1995-96 to 1998-99 under Social Action Plan (SAP). The objective of PIHS, a 
national sample survey, was to provide household and community level data, which could 
be used to monitor, evaluate, and assess the impact of SAP. The PIHS data provides 
information on the income of households and gender disaggregated enrollments in public 
and private schools, colleges and universities, which offer an opportunity to estimate the 
distribution of government subsidies in the education sector at provincial levels.  
 
The paper begins, in section II, with a brief review of the benefit incidence approach and 
establishes how gender dis-aggregations can be readily incorporated in the analysis. 
Section III presents the result of Benefit Incidence of educational spending in Pakistan at 
provincial level. Section IV highlights the regional gender inequality by using data from 
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) 1998-99. Section V makes some 
concluding observations and offers some policy implications. 
 
2.  THE ‘BENEFIT INCIDENCE’ OF PUBLIC SPENDING 
The technique employed in this paper to assess gender differentials in public service 
provision is ‘benefit incidence analysis’. This has become an established approach in 
estimating the distribution of public expenditures since the path-breaking work on 
Malaysia by Meerman (1979) and on Colombia by Selowsky (1979)
3. There has been a 
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recent resurgence of interest and incorporation of gender dimension in the approach, 
reviewed in Van de Walle and Nead (1995), Van de Walle (1998) and Lionel Demery 
(2000).  
 
The technique usually involves a three-step methodology. First, estimates are obtained on 
the unit cost of providing a particular service. These are usually based on officially 
reported public spending on the service in question. Second, these unit costs are then 
imputed to households, which are identified (usually through a household expenditure 
survey) as users of the service. Households, which use a subsidized public service in 
effect, gain an in-kind transfer, which depends on the unit subsidy involved (say the 
subsidy per primary school enrollment) and the number of units consumed by the 
household (the number of children currently enrolled in a public primary school). Finally, 
aggregated estimates of benefit incidence are obtained in groups ordered by income. In 
brief, benefit incidence analysis measures the distribution of in kind transfers across the 
households.  
 
Expenditure incidence analysis therefore brings together two sources of information. 
First, data on the government subsidy (estimated as the unit cost of providing the service 
less any cost recovery back to the government) allocated to the education. Second, 
information on the use of public education services by individuals and households, which 
is usually obtained from household surveys. 
 
The disaggregated benefit incidence analysis by gender based on the assumption that 
government provide in-kind subsidy by providing subsidized schools, colleges and 
universities and to gain the subsidy, households must enroll children at publicly 
subsidized educational institutions. If households typically send more boys than girls to 
these publicly-funded schools, there will be a gender difference in benefit incidence, 
simply because more of the government subsidy will be utilize boys than girls.  
   5
As earlier mention, the three steps for disaggregated benefit analysis can easily be 
transformed mathematically by considering the group-specific benefit incidence of 


















E X ……………………….(1) 
Xj is the value of the total education subsidy imputed to group j.  Eij represents the 
number of school enrollments of group j at education level i, and Ei the total number of 
enrollments (across all groups) at that level.  Si is government net spending on education 
level i (with fees and other cost recovery netted out), and i (=1,..,3) denotes the level of 
education (primary, secondary, and tertiary). The share of the total education subsidy (S) 


























x               (2) 
 
Clearly, this share is determined by two factors: the share of the gender in total 
enrollments at each level of education (eij ), and the share of each level of education in 
total education spending (si ). eij is determined by household enrollment decisions,  
whereas si reflects government spending allocations. 
 
3. EDUCATION SUBSIDIES IN PAKISTAN 
Under the constitution of Pakistan, education is a provincial subject. Consequently, 
provincial governments are primarily responsible for financing the provision of 
educational services. However, federal government plays an important role in the 
financing of higher education. This financing is administrated by University grant 
commission (UGC)
4, which provides financial support to general and technical 
universities, colleges and institutes. As a result, calculation of unit subsides for higher 
education contains both provincial and federal public expenditure. 
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3.1  Public Education System in Pakistan 
The structure of Pakistan’s public education system has the following m ain 
characteristics described as follows: first, there is the basic education. The basic 
education system consists of early childhood education (or pre-primary schooling), which 
is optional for children 3 to 5 years old and called kachi Pehli. After that primary 
education where the official entry age is 5 year and ideally should be completed in 5 
years at the age of 9 years. The next level, following primary education, is secondary 
level education, consists five years of education after primary education started from the 
age 10 years and ideally ended at the age of 14 years.  
 
Subsequently level of education after secondary education is tertiary level with two 
options available to students who may choose polytechnic Institutes and colleges for 
technical education, and general colleges/schools for higher secondary education. Finally, 
after completion of two-year higher secondary education next level of education 
encompasses three lines of study: a system of technological/engineering colleges and 
universities, medical colleges and universities, and general colleges and universities.  
 
However, from the perspective of public finance there are four broad categories, which 
generally reported in budget documents of provincial and federal governments. These are 
primary, secondary, general colleges and universities, and finally technical and 
professional institutes, colleges and universities. In this report, we used all four categories 
for the analysis of incidence of public spending in education and named than primary, 
secondary, tertiary (included general colleges and universities) and professional 
education (included technical institutes, professional colleges and universities).  
 
3.2  Source of Data 
The information on the income of households and enrollments in public schools, colleges 
and universities at various levels of education is taken from the micro data of Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) Round 3: 1998-99. PIHS is a national survey 
conducted by Federal Bureau of Statistics, which provides household and community 
level data on various indicators related to education, health, water sanitation and 
population welfare. The data on public spending on education is taken from the federal   7
and provincial demand for grants and appropriation 1999-2000. Finally the data on cost 
recovery is taken from Estimates of Receipts 1999-2000 for each respective province. 
 
3.3  Unit Subsidies in Education 
Table –1 presents the result of province-wise estimates of unit subsidies in education.  
Second column of table 1 represents the gross unit subsidy – current cost to the 
governments of a student study in a particular level in a public institution. It is calculated 
as total recurrent spending of provincial and federal governments on a specific level of 
public education divided by total number of students of same level in the province. Third 
column corresponds to any revenue from cost recovery from a specific level divided by 
number of students of same level. Finally, the last column represents the net subsidy for 
all levels and for all provinces, which is simply the difference of column 2 and 3.  
  Table 1  
  EDUCATION UNIT SUBSIDIES IN 1998-99 
                    (Rs./Anum)
Education unit subsidies (per student) 
   Gross  Cost recovery  Net 
Primary Education      
   Punjab                       2,686                         30.20                            2,656  
   Sindh                       3,100                           1.62                            3,098  
   NWFP                       2,201                           0.11                            2,200  
   Balochistan                       1,555                              -                              1,555  
Secondary Education      
   Punjab                       1,445                         79.07                            1,366  
   Sindh                       2,093                         63.23                            2,029  
   NWFP                       2,915                         71.79                            2,843  
   Balochistan                       2,605                           2.44                            2,603  
General & Professional Colleges/Universities/Institutes    
   Punjab                       5,538                            562                            4,976  
   Sindh                       3,655                            299                            3,356  
   NWFP                       9,172                            200                            8,972  
   Balochistan                       7,126                             53                             7,073  
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Provincial & Federal Demand for Grants 1999-00, Estimates of Receipts 1999-00, 
& PIHS 1998-99 
 
Table 1 reveals the regional disparities in the unit subsidies in education, which also 
varies with level of education. For instance, in case of primary education, the amount of 
unit subsidies is highest in Sindh, following Punjab and NWFP, lowest in Balochistan. 
However, this does not imply that Sindh spends the highest amount among the four   8
provinces, because, it is the combination of two factors: demand of public education and 
total public expenditures on a particular levels. 
 
Unit cost estimates reported in Table – 1 are limited in several respects. First, due to 
unavailability of actual public spending on education, estimates of unit subsidies are 
based on provincial and federal revised estimates of public spending on education. 
According to the historical trend in public finances of the country, actual spending on 
education may appear less than revised estimates. As a result, these reported estimates of 
subsidies may contain an upward bias and overly stated amount of subsidies. Second, in 
the absence of disaggregated data, unit subsidies were obtained as provincial averages, 
ignoring gender and urban rural variations. It may lead to over or under estimation of 
regional and gender unit subsidies. Furthermore, number of students for the estimation of 
subsidies have taken from PIHS data after multiplying with blow up factor and may 
contain sampling or non sampling errors which over or under estimates the amount unit 
subsidies. 
 
4.  GENDER DISPARITY IN EDUCATION  
There are several ways to measure gender differentials in education. Gross and net 
enrollment rates often reveal gender differences, especially when reported by income 
quartiles, similarly completion and drop out rates are another way to highlight gender 
disparities in education. However, gross enrollment is the widely used basic indicator, 
which highlights gender disparity at the first stage of the education and indicates lake of 
access to educational facilities for women. Therefore, as a first step, gender disparity in 
education is highlighted by gross enrollment ratio and subsequently gender disaggregated 
estimates of benefit incidence are presented.  
 
4.1  Gender Disparity in Gross Enrollment Ratio      
Table 2 presents the province-wise gross enrollment rates
5 divided into three broad 
categories; primary, secondary and tertiary, and by income quartiles, and gender. The 
gross enrollment rates show typical biases in enrollment behavior, with males being more 
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likely to be enrolled in school, and with the bias becoming more noticeable with higher 
levels of schooling. Another interesting point, which emerges from Table 2 is provincial 
variation in gender specific enrollments. Gender disparity in education is higher in 
Balochistan and NWFP as compared to Sindh and Punjab.  
 
Table 2 
Gross Enrollment Ratio by Gender, Quartile and Province (1998-99) 
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  Income Level 
/Province  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Punjab              
Rich  101% 81% 89% 74% 16% 12%
Upper Middle  92% 86% 78% 62% 8% 5%
Lower Middle  82% 72% 59% 45% 3% 3%
Poor  65% 53% 39% 25% 2% 1%
All Group  80% 68% 62% 46% 7% 5%
Sindh   
Rich  87% 73% 105% 59% 25% 10%
Upper Middle  80% 55% 82% 51% 16% 6%
Lower Middle  66% 47% 61% 38% 12% 4%
Poor  49% 35% 47% 29% 9% 4%
All Group  64% 46% 65% 40% 15% 6%
NWFP   
Rich  105% 80% 106% 56% 17% 10%
Upper Middle  88% 55% 79% 36% 11% 5%
Lower Middle  80% 56% 61% 24% 7% 1%
Poor  67% 31% 53% 11% 3% 0%
All Group  81% 50% 70% 28% 9% 4%
Balochistan   
Rich  80% 67% 76% 47% 22% 4%
Upper Middle  78% 33% 76% 26% 12% 2%
Lower Middle  68% 43% 50% 14% 5% 1%
Poor  54% 36% 51% 13% 4% 0%
All Group  69% 43% 62% 22% 11% 2%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99  
 
4.2  Gender Disaggregated Benefit Incidence Estimates        
By combining the unit cost of the public education system with the use of public 
schooling facilities by household, we can estimate the benefit incidence of government 
spending on education. The province-wise results of this exercise (based on the subsidy   10
schedule of Table 1) are reported in Table 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D respectively. Three types 
of disaggregation are reported: first, the subsidy is distributed across the four income 
quartiles starting from the richest 25 percent to the poorest 25 percent of the population; 
second, the benefit incidence estimates are disaggregated by education level; and finally, 
it is reported by gender. 
 
4.2(a)  Punjab 
Three clear messages emerge from the estimates of benefit incidence (see Table-3A). The 
first message is that education spending is reasonably progressive at the primary level; 
the subsidy to the poorest quartile forms a higher share than the subsidy to the richest 
quartile. This progressiveness is particularly striking in relative terms; the poorest 25 
percent population of Punjab received more than 35 percent of the subsidy. While, the 
richest 25 percent receive only 13 percent of the subsidy at the primary level (see the last 
column of Table-3A).  However, in the case of subsidy at the secondary level the main 
beneficiaries are lower and middle-income groups, which indicates that subsidy is less 
progressive. In contrast, educational subsidy at tertiary level is regressive and the highest 
share received by the richest 25 percent, which receive more than 50 percent of the 
subsidy at the tertiary level. 
 
The second message is that the progressiveness at the primary level is illusionary because 
the share in subsidy it is not adjusted by the group wise population. The per capita 
estimates of level-wise subsidy presents a real picture of the incidence. According to this 
indicator the lowest per capita subsidy received by the poorest 25 percent of the 
population in all three educational categories. However, this picture varies with the level 
of education, it is relatively better at the primary level and worse at the tertiary level. 
 
Finally, the gender disparity persists at all educational levels and in all income classes. It 
clearly emerges, that the pattern of subsidy is biased towards females, for instance, at the 
primary level 45 percent, at the secondary level 39 percent and at the tertiary level 45 
percent share of the subsidy spent on females and rest on males. This result is also 
consistent with the per-capita estimates and in all cases per-capita estimates are lower for   11
females and higher for males. In addition, females belonging to the poorest 25 percent 
population receive the lowest share in education subsidy at all levels of education and it 
is lowest at the tertiary level.  
 Table – 3A 
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education - Punjab 
Male  Female  Total 
Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Income Level 
(Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%) 
Primary Level              
Rich  1,544 8% 1,012  5% 1,292 13%
Upper Middle  1,536 11% 1,419  10% 1,478 21%
Lower Middle  1,593 16% 1,448  15% 1,521 30%
Poor  1,341 20% 1,065  15% 1,206 35%
All Group  1,475 55% 1,233  45% 1,356 100%
Secondary Level            
Rich  824 14% 681  9% 760 22%
Upper Middle  852 17% 594  11% 729 27%
Lower Middle  680 16% 497  12% 590 28%
Poor  468 15% 249  8% 359 22%
All Group  670 61% 455  39% 566 100%
Tertiary Level              
Rich  529 28% 435  24% 482 53%
Upper Middle  261 17% 183  12% 222 29%
Lower Middle  84 5% 94  6% 89 12%
Poor  74 4% 45  3% 59 7%
All Group  229 55% 179  45% 203 100%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for Grants 1999-2000 
 
4.2(b)  Sindh 
Similar to Punjab, estimates of benefit incidence portray the same picture in Sindh (see 
Table – 3B).  Education spending is reasonably progressive at the primary level; the 
subsidy to the poorest quartile amounts to a higher share than the subsidy to other income 
groups and the share of the subsidy decreases gradually with increase in income. The 
poorest 25 percent population of Sindh receives more than 35 percent of the subsidy. In 
contrast, the richest 25 percent receives only 11 percent of the subsidy at the primary 
level (see the last column of Table-3B). A similar pattern exists at secondary level with a 
slight change in magnitude ranging from 31 percent to the poorest income group and 14 
percent to the richest income group. However, this pattern reverts at the tertiary level, the 
main beneficiaries are the richest income group, which receives 35 percent of the   12
subsidy. The subsidy at the tertiary level of education is regressive in nature and share of 
the subsidy decreases with decline in income level and the lowest share in the subsidy at 
tertiary level received by the poorest income group, which is only 16 percent. 
 
Similar to Punjab, per-capita estimates of the subsidy is not consistent with the share-
wise benefit incidence and lowest per-capita subsidy at all educational levels is received 
by the poorest income group. However, the highest per capita subsidy is received by the 
poorest 25 percent of population at the primary level and lowest at the tertiary level of 
education.   
 
Table – 3B 
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education - Sindh 
Male  Female  Total 
Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Income Level 
(Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%) 
Primary Level              
Rich  1,410 6%  1,133 5% 1,276 11%
Upper Middle  1,658 13%  1,162 9% 1,413 22%
Lower Middle  1,537 18%  1,015 12% 1,273 31%
Poor  1,236 21%  907 15% 1,075 36%
All Group  1,422 59%  1,011 41% 1,218 100%
Secondary Level            
Rich  1,294 9%  664 5% 972 14%
Upper Middle  1,263 17%  766 10% 1,025 27%
Lower Middle  1,028 18%  638 10% 839 28%
Poor  830 20%  523 11% 684 31%
All Group  1,034 64%  626 36% 837 100%
Tertiary Level              
Rich  682 29%  177 6% 452 35%
Upper Middle  393 22%  135 6% 276 28%
Lower Middle  284 16%  84 4% 192 20%
Poor  201 11%  87 5% 145 16%
All Group  371 79%  115 21% 252 100%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for Grants 1999-2000 
 
The relative disadvantage of females with respect to access to education follows a steady 
pattern in Sindh. It is lowest at the primary level, where they receive 41 percent of the 
total subsidy for primary education; this disadvantage gradually increases with the level 
of education and is greatest at the tertiary level, where they receive only 21 percent of the   13
total subsidy at tertiary level education. This pattern confirms the hypothesis that relative 
disadvantage increases with the level of education. Similarly, in per capita terms, females 
receive lower subsidy in each income group at all educational levels. 
 
4.2(c)  NWFP   
In contrast to Punjab and Sindh, estimates of benefit incidence demonstrate a different 
pattern in NWFP (see Table – 3C).  Education spending is not reasonably progressive at 
any level of education. Moreover, except primary education, poorest population receives 
the lowest share in educational subsidies; particularly at the tertiary level the poorest 
income group receives only 8 percent of the subsidy. A similar pattern exists also at the 
secondary level with a slight change in magnitudes ranging from 22 percent to the 
poorest income group and 28 percent to the upper middle-income group. However, the 
pattern of subsidy distribution is slightly different at the primary level, where the main 
beneficiaries are the low middle-income group, which receives 33 percent of the subsidy, 
and 28 percent is received by the poorest income group, and 24 percent is received by the 
upper middle income and 15 percent is received by the richest income group.  
 
As in the case of the other provinces, per-capita estimates of the subsidy are inconsistent 
with the share of subsidy and the lowest per-capita subsidy at all levels of education 
receive by  to the poorest income group. . However, the highest per capita subsidy is 
received by the poorest 25 percent of population at the primary level and lowest at the 
tertiary level of education. 
 
The relative disadvantage to females was lowest at the primary level, where they receive 
37 percent of the total primary subsidy and the greatest at the tertiary level, where they 
receive only 29 percent of the total subsidy for the tertiary level.  It is also interesting to 
note that the relative disadvantage of females is inversely correlated with level of income. 
For instance, females in the poorest quartile of income receive only one-third of the 
primary education subsidy received by the poorest 25 percent and males receive 
remaining two-third.  In contrast, females in the richest quartile of income receive almost 
half of the primary education subsidy received by the richest 25 percent and males   14
receive remaining half. This disadvantage further increases with the level of education – 
females in the poorest quartile receive only 5 percent of the secondary education subsidy 
and almost zero percent at tertiary level. 
 
Table –3C 
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education - NWFP 
Male  Female  Total 
Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Income Level 
(Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%) 
Primary Level              
Rich  1,436 8%  1,223 7% 1,325 15%
Upper Middle  1,578 15%  1,039 10% 1,318 24%
Lower Middle  1,629 22%  1,128 12% 1,410 33%
Poor  1,329 19%  646 9% 983 28%
All Group  1,492 63%  945 37% 1,228 100%
Secondary Level            
Rich  2,129 14%  1,129 8% 1,600 23%
Upper Middle  1,882 19%  917 9% 1,420 28%
Lower Middle  1,602 19%  675 8% 1,139 27%
Poor  1,398 18%  303 5% 805 22%
All Group  1,694 70%  679 30% 1,173 100%
Tertiary Level              
Rich  934 29%  616 19% 773 48%
Upper Middle  732 23%  223 8% 470 31%
Lower Middle  333 11%  54 2% 184 13%
Poor  214 8%  5 0% 111 8%
All Group  536 71%  209 29% 368 100%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for Grants 1999-2000 
 
4.2(d)  Balochistan 
as in the case of NWFP, estimates of benefit incidence demonstrate that education 
spending is not reasonably progressive at any level of education in Balochistan (see 
Table-3D). Moreover, except primary education, poorest population receives the lowest 
share in educational subsidies; particularly at the tertiary level of education; the poorest 
income group receives only 8 percent of the subsidy. A similar pattern exists at the 
secondary level with slight change in magnitudes ranging from 21 percent to the poorest 
income group and 33 percent to the upper middle-income group. However, this pattern 
differs at the primary level, where the main beneficiaries are low middle-income group, 
which receive 30 percent of the subsidy, and 26 percent is received by the upper middle   15
income group, and 23 percent receive by the poorest income group, and 21 percent by the 
richest income group.  
 
Similar to other provinces, per-capita estimates of the subsidy are not consistent with the 
share and lowest per-capita subsidy at all levels of education and the lowest per capita 
subsidies are received by the poorest income group. Moreover, this picture varies with 
the level of education, relatively better at primary level and worse at the tertiary level. 
 
Table – 3D 
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education - Balochistan 
Male  Female  Total 
Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Per Capita Share  Income Level 
(Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%)  (Rs.)  (%) 
Primary Level              
Rich  1,091 12%  972 9% 1,038 21%
Upper Middle  1,158 20%  477 6% 858 26%
Lower Middle  1,028 20%  667 11% 865 30%
Poor  820 14%  551 9% 690 23%
All Group  1,019 66%  636 34% 844 100%
Secondary Level            
Rich  1,774 16%  1,021 8% 1,416 24%
Upper Middle  1,939 28%  636 5% 1,450 33%
Lower Middle  1,266 17%  363 5% 824 22%
Poor  1,311 17%  348 4% 831 21%
All Group  1,563 77%  539 23% 1,091 100%
Tertiary Level              
Rich  1453 44%  199 6% 851 50%
Upper Middle  576 25%  78 3% 337 28%
Lower Middle  369 12%  78 2% 232 15%
Poor  223 8%  6 0% 119 8%
All Group  631 89%  87 11% 372 100%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for Grants 1999-2000 
 
In Balochistan, the pattern of relative disadvantage to females with respect to access to 
education is similar to other provinces. However, magnitudes of subsidies present a 
bleaker picture. It is the lowest at the tertiary level, where they receive only 11 percent of 
the total subsidy for professional education and the greatest at the primary level, where 
they receive 34 percent of the total primary subsidy. Similarly females receive lowest per 
capita subsidies in each income group at all levels.   16
5.  REGIONAL GENDER DISPARITY 
Gender disaggregated benefit incidence results can be used to provide a comparative 
picture of regional gender disparity.  To grasp the comparative picture of regional gender 
disparity, we computed female-male ratio of benefit incidence of public spending by 
region. The result of this exercise is presented in Figure 1. It is clear from Figure 1, that 
the relative disadvantage of females to access public education was higher in rural areas 
as compare to urban areas. All rural areas and urban Sindh and Balochistan follow the 
same pattern of disadvantage – higher disadvantage with higher level of education.   
 
The disadvantage is the greatest in rural Balochistan and Sindh. This observation is 
compatible with the expectation that female enrollment rates decrease with the level of 
education. In contrast, it emerges from figure 1, that there is relative disadvantage to 
males with respect to access to public education in urban Punjab at the primary and the 
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6.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Gender disaggregated benefit analysis of public spending on education can be used to 
describe why the poorest income quartile has less access to public education specially at 
the higher level of education. The answer is to be found, in part, in the greater gender 
enrollment bias among the poorest sections of the society. For example in Balochistan, 
males in the poorest quartile receive 14 percent and 17 percent of the subsidy at primary 
and secondary level, while females in the poorest quartile receive 9 and 4 percent of the 
subsidy at the primary and secondary level respectively. However, females in the richest 
income group receive 9 and 8 percent of the subsidy at the primary and secondary level 
respectively, which is share-wise equal at primary level and higher at secondary level 
with compare to females of the poorest segment of the society. This trend also persists in 
the secondary education subsidy of other provinces excluding Sindh and tertiary and 
professional level subsidies of all provinces where females of poorest gain less than rich 
groups. The gender inequality, therefore, is a critical component of overall inequality in 
the benefit incidence of education spending. 
 
These results powerfully demonstrate how public spending on education benefit males 
more than females in Pakistan in 1998-99, and this in turn influences the overall 
inequality of education spending in the country. It does so for a combination of reasons: 
first, households choose to enroll males more than females at all levels of schooling (see 
Table 2), therefore, a gender bias would be present in the benefit incidence of public 
spending on education; second, public spending is not properly targeted to the regions of 
higher gender disparities and as a result, public spending is not sufficiently contributing 
in the reduction of gender disparity.  
 
Based on the benefit incidence analysis three sets of policies can be recommended to 
improve gender equality in the society. First, the poorest segment of the society receives 
the lowest per capita subsidy; therefore, public policies related to public spending on 
education should be targeted towards the region with higher level of poverty. Second, in 
the presence of higher regional gender inequality, region specific education policy may 
be helpful for the gender equality, specially public spending in rural areas on female   18
education will play a vital role as compare to urban areas. Finally province-wise policies 
related to gender equality in education at various level works better than the national 
policies. For instance, in Balochistan, a reasonable proportion of the government budget 
is devoted to schooling services which females tended not to use—tertiary education 
institutions. A shift of spending towards primary and secondary schooling would lead to 
an improvement in the share of the total budget going to females (as well as to poorer 
groups in the community). In contrast, such policy is not helpful for the other regions 
particularly in Punjab and NWFP where female enrollments were higher at tertiary public 
institutions.  Therefore, a shift of spending towards tertiary level would lead to an 
improvement in the share of the total budget going to females. However, such decisions 
should not rest on benefit incidence estimates alone. They should also be based on a 



















   19
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Ablo, Emmanuel, and Ritva Reinikka (1998). “Do budgets really matter?  Evidence 
from public spending on education and health in Uganda”.  World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 1926 (June). 
 
Alderman, Harold et al. (1995). ‘Public Schooling Expenditures in Rural Pakistan: 
Efficiently Targeting Girls and a Lagging Region.” In: Public Spending and the Poor: 
Theory and Evidence, edited by Dominique van de Wale and Kimberly Nead, published 
by Johns Hopkins, Baltimore 
 
Brennan, Geoffrey (1976). “The Distributional Implications of Public Goods.” 
Econometrica Vol. 44  pp. 391-399. 
 
Castro-Leal, Florencia, and Julia Dayton, Lionel Demery, and Kalpana Mehra (1999). 
“Public Social Spending in Africa: Do the Poor Benefit?” The World Bank Research 
Observer V14 N1, pp.49-72 
 
Cornes, Richard (1995). “Measuring the Distributional Impact of Public Goods”. 
Chapter 4 in Van de Walle and Nead (1995). 
 
Crouch, Luis A. (1996). “Public Education Equity and Efficiency in South Africa: 
Lessons for Other Countries.” Economics of Education Review V15 N2, pp.125-137 
 
Demery, Lionel (1996).  “Gender and Public Social Spending: Disaggregating Benefit 
Incidence”.  Poverty and Social Policy Department, World Bank (unprocessed). 
 
Demery, Lionel (2000), “Benefit Incidence: a practitioner’s guide”, Poverty and Social 
Development Group Africa Region, The World Bank.  
 
Government of Balochistan (1999-2000). “Demands for Grants and appropriations, 
Current Expenditures ”, Finance Department. 
 
Government of Balochistan (1999-2000). “Estimates of Receipts for 1999-2000”, 
Finance Department. 
 
Government of NWFP (1999-2000). “Demands for Grants, Current Expenditures ”, 
Finance Department. 
 
Government of NWFP (1999-2000). “Estimates of Receipts for 1999-2000”, Finance 
Department. 
 
Government of Pakistan (1998-99). “Pakistan Integrated Household survey 1998-99.”  
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad.  
 
Government of Pakistan (1999-00). “Details of Demand for Grants and Appropriations 
1999-00, Current Expenditure, Vol. 1.”  Finance Division, Islamabad.   20
Government of Punjab (1999-2000). “Estimates of Charged Expenditures and Demands 
for Grants, Current Expenditures ”, Finance Department. 
 
Government of Punjab (1999-2000). “Estimates of Receipts for 1999-2000”, Finance 
Department. 
 
Government of Sindh (1999-2000). “Estimates of Charged Expenditures and Demands 
for Grants, Current Expenditures ”, Finance Department. 
 
Government of Sindh (1999-2000). “Estimates of Receipts for 1999-2000”, Finance 
Department. 
 
Hamid, S. and Siddiqui, R. (2002), “Gender Differences in Demand for Schooling.” 
Conference paper, presented in the 17
th Annual General Meeting and Conference of the 
Pakistan Society of Development Economists, Islamabad January 14 – 16, 2002. 
 
Hammer, Jeffrey, Ijaz Nabi and James A. Cercon (1995). “Distributional Effects of 
Social Sector Expenditures in Malaysia, 1974-89.” Chapter 18 in Van de Walle and 
Nead (1995). 
 
Kumar, Raj (2000),  “Women and Education: Encyclopedia of Women and 
Development Series”. Edited by Kumar Raj, published by Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 
New Delhi, India.  
 
Meerman, Jacob  (1979). Public Expenditures in Malaysia:  Who Benefits and Why?  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
 
Selden, Thomas M. and Michael J. Wasylenko [1995]. “Measuring the Distributional 
Effects of Public Education in Peru.’ In: Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and 
Evidence”, edited by Dominique van de Wale and Kimberly Nead, published by Johns 
Hopkins, Baltimore. 
 
Selowsky, Marcelo (1979). “Who Benefits from Government Expenditure?”  (New 
York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Van de Walle, Dominique (1995), “The Distribution of Subsidies Through Public 
Health Services in Indonesia, 1978-87.” Chapter 9 in van de Walle and Nead (1995). 
 
Van de Walle, Dominique [1998]. “Assessing the Welfare Impacts of Public Spending.” 
World Development. Vol. 26 No. 3, pp.365-379 
 
Van de Walle, Dominique and Kimberly Nead [1995]. “Public Spending and the Poor. 
Theory and Evidence”. Johns Hopkins and World Bank, Washington DC 
 
Van de Walle, Dominique, and Kimberly Nead (1995), “Public Spending and the Poor: 
Theory and Evidence”.  Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md. 